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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a police officer stopping cars for a drug search and
that you have reliable statistical information that African Americans are more
likely to engage in drug trafficking.1 Most people believe that in such a case it
would be efficient to search more African Americans compared to the rest of
the population. Some object to targeting African Americans because of equity
considerations, but they are likely to think that it is efficient, albeit not socially
desirable. As we explain, this is not necessarily true. Minimizing ordinary
crime such as drug trafficking is achieved, by and large, through deterrence.
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I. For the seminal work on racial profiling employed in drug searches, see John Knowles et al.,
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001) (analyzing
data showing that sixty-three percent of the persons stopped and searched by the state police along 1-95
were African American and twenty-nine percent were white, whereas the assumed proportion of
African-American drivers on the road was roughly eighteen percent; and finding that the above
disproportionate stops and searches could be explained by police use of accurate statistical information
in an effort to maximize search success rates). Although widely condemned, the practice has actually
expanded since September 11, 2001, probably because the use of ethnic profiling in the war on terrorism
seems more legitimate. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL
PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial-profiling/report/rp-report.pdf.
This is consistent with predictions and analyses carried out by leading scholars in the field. See, e.g.,
R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575-76
(2003) ("Nearly all of the stop-search studies document the disproportionate investigation of blacks and
Latinos, even in jurisdictions that have prohibited racial profiling." (internal citations omitted)); Bernard
E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling. A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1290-91
(2004) (commenting that data showing disproportionate stops and searches of minorities are consistent,
and that it is realistic to assume that the police are using racial profiling); William J. Stuntz, Local
Policing After the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2142 (2002) ("In terms of how we police the police,
profiling is the great issue of our time.").
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Deterrence should concentrate on those individuals who are equally likely to
commit a crime or to abide by the law ("marginal offenders"). Being a member
of the marginal offenders group is not the same as being a member of a group
that, on average, commits more crimes.
It may well be the case that even if African Americans have a greater
propensity to commit a certain crime, say, drug trafficking, an efficient racial
profiling policy would target non-African Americans, as being more
susceptible to deterrence-that is, as being overrepresented in the marginal
offenders group. The option of targeting the group with the lower offending
rate has never before been considered.
To exemplify our argument, assume that when randomly (that is, not
relying on race as a signal) stopping cars and searching them for drugs, ten
percent of the African-American drivers searched are found to possess drugs,
whereas only five percent of the non-African-American drivers searched are
found to possess drugs.
Plausibly assuming that the police budget is constrained-that is, the
number of searches is fixed 2-- deviating from a random search rule toward
searching a higher percentage of African-American drivers would improve the
chances of finding drugs (maximizing "hit rate"). In fact, plausibly assuming
that all other relevant signals, such as driving in a car with tinted windows, are
equally distributed across racial groups, searching only African Americans
would seem to maximize the hit rate.
To see this, imagine having a budget constraint of ten searches. Starting
from a random search rule, consider searching one more targeted group
member at the expense of searching one fewer non-targeted group member. As
you will quickly realize, each time you consider whom to search, you will be
better off searching a targeted group member. The end result is that all ten
searches will be of targeted group members.
This, however, is not necessarily correct, as targeting one group's members
for inspection is likely to reduce that targeted group's members' criminal
activity, whereas the rest of the population is likely to increase its criminal
activity. 3 Hence, searching the targeted group members would not necessarily
maximize hit rate, nor would it be efficient, defining efficiency as that
allocation of police resources which minimizes crime (by enhanced deterrence).
By introducing a concept of "marginal offenders" (those individuals who
are equally likely to commit a crime or to abide by the law), we show that
2. Having roadblocks on the highways searching all, or a large number of, drivers is prohibitively
costly.
3. This is based on an assumption that the relevant population perceives the differential police
enforcement efforts. This assumption may not be perfectly realistic, but is nevertheless the cornerstone
of the economic analysis of racial profiling. See Knowles et al., supra note 1, at 206 ("Our model




racial profiling-that is, an informed deviation from a random search rule-
would always be efficient. If the reduction in targeted group criminal activity
outweighs the increase in the criminal activity of the rest of the population,
there will be an efficiency gain. Otherwise, targeting the rest of the population
would result in an efficiency gain. A random search (no profiling) rule would
be efficient only in the knife-edge case where both effects exactly offset each
other. The vast literature on racial profiling has so far failed to acknowledge
this point.
Our novel economic framework further allows us to make an important
distinction, overlooked by the literature, between racial profiling employed in
the context of terrorism and that employed in the context of ordinary crime.4
As we explain in Section I.C. below, the outcome of efficient policing in
the context of terror is prevention, that is, incapacitation, not deterrence.5 A
terrorist, willing to sacrifice her life, cannot be deterred by criminal sanctions.
Hence there is an identity between marginal and infra-marginal terrorists, and
racial profiling should always target the group bearing the higher propensity to
commit an act of terror.
In addition to efficiency, an optimal screening rule should take into account
equity considerations. As is well known, racial profiling entails significant
equity costs. These costs are positively correlated with the extent to which the
group targeted suffers from underlying discrimination, as in the case of
minorities and women.
6
Drawing attention to the counterintuitive option we raise in this paper, of
efficiently targeting the majority group members even when the majority group
has a lower offending rate than the minority group, we discuss the possibility
that such a racial profiling rule may advance both equity and efficiency.
Addressing the case in which racial minorities are targeted, we argue that
there should be some sacrifice of efficiency to reduce equity costs, and we
examine two alternative policies. The first is providing monetary compensation
4. Drug searches and post-September Il airport security checks are the two most prominent
examples of racial profiling. It is sometimes posited that profiling in the context of terror entails lower
equity costs, because passengers can be prepared for the inconvenience, and are assumed to be more
sympathetic to the policy objective of preventing plane hijacking and/or crashing. See, e.g., Mathias
Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Projiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131, 162 (2004). The literature
does not distinguish, however, between terror and ordinary crimes when discussing efficiency aspects of
racial profiling.
5. For a discussion of the different functions of sanctions, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATION OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473-568 (2004). The functions include rehabilitation and retribution, in
addition to deterrence and incapacitation. The latter two rationales for criminal justice are beyond the
scope of our analysis as we focus on deterrence (for ordinary criminals) and incapacitation (for
terrorists).
6. When the targeted group is not subject to discrimination on other grounds, profiling does not
entail significant stigma. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 212 ("[A]lthough gender profiling does declare men more crime prone than women,
no one believes that it expresses contempt for men or marks them as the less worthy gender.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
raised and distributed via the tax and transfer system to compensate for equity
costs entailed by an efficient profiling rule. The second is to modify the
efficient profiling rule by reducing the extent of profiling (shifting police
resources toward the non-targeted group). We argue that racial profiling may be
a rare example of a case in which compensation should be awarded on an ex
ante basis for efficiency reasons. Finally, we explain why the option of
compensation may be banned on social grounds.
We then prove, by employing a marginal analysis technique, that the
optimal profiling rule, even when monetary compensation is a viable policy
option, should not be set at its most efficient point. In doing so, we provide an
example contrary to conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature
that advocates setting the legal rule at its most efficient point and using the tax
and transfer system to compensate for inequities, proving that such a rule may
not be optimal. The general structure of this Article is as follows: In Part I we
examine the efficiency determinants of racial profiling and discuss the optimal
extent of profiling when efficiency is the only concern. This Part is particularly
important, because much of the confusion in the existing literature stems from a
failure to account properly for the efficiency aspects of racial profiling.7 In Part
II we examine the equity costs entailed by racial profiling, distinguishing
between costs that are the outcome of any profiling rule and those that are due
to the rule's racial component. In Part III we analyze the efficiency-equity
tradeoff problem raised by racial profiling.
I. EFFICIENCY
On February 27, 2001, in an address to Congress, President Bush
announced that racial profiling 8 is "wrong" and promised to "end it in
America." 9 And indeed, to date, more than twenty states have enacted
legislation that prohibits racial profiling and/or requires jurisdictions within the
state to collect data on law enforcement stops and searches in order to eliminate
the practice.' 0 Nevertheless, the practice has actually expanded."
7. Laying down the micro-foundation is necessary for an accurate explanation of how profiling
works. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 134 (1994) ("Most
political disagreements are buttressed by false beliefs about how policies impinge upon values. By
correcting such errors, science improves the quality of policy debate or even imposes a framework upon
it.").
8. Criminal profiling is the law enforcement practice of taking certain traits into account in deciding
whether to initiate the stop, search, or investigation of a suspect. We define the term "racial profiling" as
referring to criminal profiling that uses "sensitive" traits such as ethnicity, national origin or race,
namely, traits that relate to groups who may suffer from discrimination.
9. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 335, 354 (Feb. 27, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/
20010228.html.
10. For a list of states and legislation, see http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/
(last visited Apr. 22, 2006).
11. See supra note 1.
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The persistence of the phenomenon calls into question the reasons for legal
law enforcement agencies' continuing to engage in a practice that is widely
condemned and often explicitly prohibited. There are two possible
explanations. One is the existence of widespread racial animus among police
officers. The other is that law enforcement agencies fird racial profiling to be
efficient.
Most of the vast literature on racial profiling engages in choosing between
the two explanations above. 12 Others have discussed the constitutionality of
racial profiling. 13 We are interested in the normative as opposed to the positive
question. A normative analysis views racial profiling from the policymaker's
point of view. The policymaker could be the police, the legislator, or the courts
using their interpretive power.
What matters to us is not the motivation of police officers or how they view
racial profiling. Instead, the question becomes one of balancing efficiency and
equity considerations, using a welfare economics framework that allows for
systematic analysis and choosing the optimal rule. 14
We therefore assume that law enforcement agents are not racist, or that
racist officers can be identified and laid off, and we examine efficiency as well
as equity aspects of racial profiling in an attempt to define the socially optimal
screening rule. Our result should then be adapted to reality, in the event that
law enforcement agents are indeed racists who cannot be identified and
removed.
Following the seminal work of Nobel laureate Gary Becker on the
determinants of crime, we assume that individuals act rationally when they
decide whether to engage in criminal activity, by taking into account the
12. See, e.g., Knowles et al., supra note 1. Although the data the authors analyze show that police
used racial profiling, their motivation was not racial animus, as evinced by the fact that the percentage of
searched drivers who were found to be carrying drugs (the "hit rate") was similar across populations.
Racist police officers, they claim, would stop and search more African Americans, due to their taste for
discrimination, and this would increase deterrence among African Americans while reducing deterrence
among whites. Under such a scenario, hit rates would be higher for whites. The fact that hit rates are
equal across racial groups is claimed to be proof that disproportionate searches do not reflect racial
prejudice. But see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
13 (2002) (ignoring the issue of responsiveness to enforcement and viewing the data on the equal hit
rates as running "contrary to long-held 'commonsense' beliefs about the effectiveness of racial
profiling" because it proves that African Americans and whites have similar offending rates); Samuel R.
Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101
MICH. L. REV. 651, 660-61 (2002) (stating the the equal hit rates "can be explained by aspects of the
process that are hidden from our view: selective reporting of stops and searches, aggressive use of
investigative procedures that do not count as 'searches,' and racial discrimination in the use of these
subsearch investigations").
13. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note I, at 1354 ("In sum, the use of race in policing may be a
constitutionally acceptable-though not necessarily socially desirable-practice under the three narrow
conditions just discussed.").
14. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 93 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that a
central objective of welfare economics is to provide a framework within which efficiency and equity
evaluations can be performed systematically).
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expected benefits and costs associated with crime. 
15
Individuals differ, both within and across groups, in the benefits/costs they
derive/incur when committing a crime. For simplicity of presentation, we
assume that the benefits are uniform; thus, the only variation across individuals
comes from the cost side. Differences in costs are equivalent to differences in
benefits, as what matters from the point of view of the prospective criminal and
varies across individuals is the net gain. In the absence of profiling, the cost and
the detection probability are assumed to be uniform across all individuals.
The cost entailed by committing a crime may be either psychic/moral or
pecuniary. The latter may include the opportunity cost of forgoing a legal job.
Suppose that the prevailing enforcement policy rules out profiling, so that
individuals are randomly selected regardless of affiliation with population
group. It is further assumed that the police are faced with a limited budget, so
that the number of searches is bounded well below the aggregate population.
Lastly, we assume that the natural offending rate (offending rate under a
random search rule) of one group (group A) exceeds that of the rest of the
population (group W).
The question that arises, under such circumstances, is whether the police
can gain from using profiling; namely, whether allowing the search policy to
vary across population groups, rather than treating all individuals as coming
from a single homogenous population group, can reduce crime, given police
budget constraints.
To understand the economic rationale for using racial profiling, consider
first a hypothetical ideal world (first-best in the terminology of welfare
economics) where personal attributes-that is, the costs incurred by individuals
15. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). We model crime from the individual's perspective as a discrete choice, a decision whether or not
to commit a single crime. This defines the individual demand for crime. Crime level is defined by the
aggregate demand. Our choice of a discrete model is made for presentation convenience purposes. The
insights gained extend to a model where demand for crime at the individual level is given by some
continuously downward sloping curve. In particular, rather than referring to the marginal offenders-
namely those individuals indifferent between committing a crime and abiding by the law-and aiming to
target population groups that are overrepresented in the population of marginal offenders, police should
focus their enforcement efforts on population groups whose contribution to marginal crime is the largest.
Marginal crime is defined by the effect a small change in the level of enforcement (say, searches
conducted) bears on the aggregate level of crime. Group marginal crime is defined in a similar way with
respect to the group crime level. Employing calculus terminology, the marginal crime would be defined
by the derivative of the aggregate demand for crime with respect to the level of enforcement. Notably,
marginal crime can be readily related to average crime level. As is well known in economics, the
elasticity is defined by the ratio of marginal and average (in our context the elasticity of the demand for
crime with respect to the level of enforcement, measuring the percentage reduction in crime per a one
percent increase in enforcement is given by the ratio of marginal crime and average crime). It
immediately follows that marginal crime is given by the product of average crime and elasticity. Hence,
comparing two distinct population groups implies that it may well be the case that the targeted group,
the one with higher marginal crime level, is the one with lower average crime level but with much
higher elasticity. This is analogous to the discrete case where the sheer fact that a population has a
higher average crime level may be attributed to its much higher fraction of infra-marginal offenders who
are irrelevant for deterrence purposes.
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committing crimes-are costless to observe. In this first-best world, police
would first target those individuals most susceptible to deterrence, namely,
those incurring the highest marginal costs when committing a crime, and
proceed in descending order. This would provide optimal deterrence; that is, it
would minimize crime subject to resource constraints.
In a second-best world, like the one we live in, where the police cannot
observe such costs (that is, they face a screening problem), racial profiling
utilizes the variation across population groups to partially compensate for the
inability to observe individual costs.
Prima facie, one would predict that more intensive targeting of the
population group with the higher natural offending rate would reduce crime.
This conclusion, however, may be wrong. Reduction in crime is primarily a
byproduct of enhanced deterrence. 16 This means enhanced targeting of the
marginal offenders, namely, those individuals who are (nearly) equally likely to
commit a crime or to abide by the law.
As we cannot directly observe the marginal offenders in the general
population, profiling may be useful for targeting the racial group whose
members are overrepresented in the marginal offenders group, relative, to its
share in the general population. This would enhance deterrence-that is, reduce
crime-by focusing police enforcement efforts on individuals who are more
likely to be marginal offenders.
Our assumption that group A has a higher offending rate, or, in other words,
is more prone to engaging in criminal activity, does not necessarily imply that
members of group A are overrepresented in the group of marginal offenders,
relative to their share in the general population.
The term "offending rate" reflects the group's average crime rate. The
average crime rate in group A could be higher than the average crime rate in
group W, due to a relatively larger number of infra-marginal offenders:
individuals whose costs in committing crime are so low that they are relatively
unaffected by police enforcement efforts. More precisely, being infra-marginal
16. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and
What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (1996) (arguing, based on analysis of the supply
dynamics of crime, that incarcerated criminals are probably quickly replaced, and therefore that the
prevention effects of enforcement are quite low, and deterrent effects dominate); Daniel Kessler &
Stephen D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements To Distinguish Between Deterrence and
Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343 (1999) (finding significant deterrent effect, but also a potentially
important role for incapacitation); Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear To Reduce
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998) (arguing
that the total crime reduction observed from policing and the reduction predicted by prevention effects
alone are similar, and therefore prevention probably dominates). We could not find empirical evidence
regarding specific types of crime. Such empirical studies would be important for an application of our
thesis. Because both effects, deterrence and incapacitation, contribute to crime reduction, there is a need
to analyze enforcement policy regarding each type of crime. In this Article we argue that deterrence is
relatively much more important in the context of drug trafficking than in the context of suicide
terrorism; therefore, the current practice of hit rate maximization is justified in the terror context but
may not be justified in the drug trafficking context.
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implies that the decision to commit a crime will not be affected by a slight
increase in police enforcement efforts.
To sum, targeting group A members would be efficient only if they were
overrepresented in the marginal offenders group relative to their share in the
general population. This cannot be derived from an assumption that their
group-wise offending rate is higher.
Racial profiling would be efficient in any case where there is a non-zero
correlation between being a marginal offender and belonging to a certain racial
population group. Only in a knife-edge case would the racial composition of
the group of marginal offenders exactly mirror the racial distribution in society.
Indeed, in such a case, there would be no gain from profiling.
1 7
The policy implication would be to shift police enforcement efforts, at the
margin, towards the racial group that is overrepresented in the marginal
offenders group, relative to its share in the general population, up to the point at
which the marginal offenders group reflects the racial composition of society.
This is the point where the crime level is minimized, given the police resource
constraint.
A. Group Size Does Not Matter
Difference in population size has no effect on the efficiency of profiling.
Suppose that the police consider whether to slightly increase the extent to
which they target a certain population group at the expense of searching the
other group.
Intuitively, one may posit that the efficiency gain (or loss) from such a
policy change will depend on the relative size of the two population groups.
Searching an additional member of the targeted group (which is assumed to be
the smaller group, namely group A, the minority) comes at the cost of searching
one fewer member of the other group (group W, the majority). This results in
two offsetting effects.
On the one hand, searching one fewer group W member will decrease the
deterrence of a relatively large number of individuals, while searching one
more group A member will increase deterrence of only a relatively small
number of individuals. Prima facie, this seems to lead us to conclude that
overall deterrence is reduced, and crime level increases. 18
On the other hand, searching one more, or one fewer, individual has a
relatively greater effect (in absolute values) on minority group members than
on majority group members, because one minority individual represents a
17. See Appendix, infra, for a graphic illustration.
18. See Harcourt, supra note 1, app. at 1296-98 (finding racial profiling unlikely to be efficient
when a minority group is targeted, as targeting the minority group will lower the offending rate of a
relatively small group of people while increasing the offending rate of a large group of people).
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higher percentage of the minority population.
The two effects work in opposite directions and exactly offset each other.
Therefore, group size does not matter.
B. Equalizing Hit Rate
Data on police stops and searches, as documented in numerous articles,
indicate a policy whereby police search disproportionately across racial
population groups, but the search success rates are similar.' 9 The evidence has
been interpreted to indicate a search policy where police aim to maximize the
hit rate.
Maximizing the hit rate does not minimize crime because it focuses on the
group-wise offending rate, reflecting the average propensity to commit a crime,
rather than focusing on marginal offenders.
To illustrate, suppose that the majority of the members of group A incur a
relatively low cost when committing a certain crime. This makes group-A
members highly prone to engaging in the specific criminal activity, or in other
words, group A has a relatively high offending rate. Suppose further, that the
majority of the members of group W incur higher costs in committing the same
type of crime, thus leading to a lower offending rate.
Group-A members are more likely to commit the crime; thus, under a
random search rule, searches of group-A members will reveal a higher
percentage of criminals compared to the percentage of criminals found in
searches of group- W members. Targeting more searches at group-A members
will further increase the success rate, up to the point at which offending rates
will be equalized across population groups. This will eventually happen
because group-A members will reduce their criminal activity in response to the
enhanced enforcement efforts directed at them, while group-W members will
correspondingly increase their criminal activity.
This, however, is not efficient because, as we explained above, the police
could do better by targeting their searches at the group with the higher
proportion of marginal offenders, who are more sensitive to deterrence,
possibly group W (the population group with the lower offending rate). Such a
policy would reduce the level of crime in society compared to the prevailing
racial profiling policy of maximizing the hit rate.
20
19. See, e.g., Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 127, 146-47 (2006); Vani K. Borooah,
Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 EuR. J. POL. ECON. 17, 32 (2001);
Knowles et al., supra note 1, at 219; Nicola Persico, Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of
Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472, 1488-89 (2002).
20. See Harcourt, supra note 1, at 1295-1303, 1322 (making a similar argument that hit rate policy
does not minimize crime and criticizing the vast literature on racial profiling which failed to understand
it-the only exception being Persico, supra note 19, at 1480). Harcourt, however, ignores the possibility
that efficient racial profiling policy would call for targeting the group with the lower offending rate, as
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C. The War on Terror
In the context of terrorism it seems plausible to assume that the deterrence
effect of using racial profiling as a law enforcement tool would be much less
pronounced than in the drug interdiction case. 21 As noted by Pape, "[a]fter
September 11, Americans know that we must expect that future al-Qaeda or
other anti-American terrorists may be equally willing to die, and so not deterred
by fear of punishment or of anything else."
22
There are various explanations as to why people become suicide terrorists,
but all of them are consistent with our assumption that the individual terrorist,
once determined to commit an act of terror, cannot be deterred.
Following Emile Durkheim's study of suicide in nineteenth century
Europe,23 which has been routinely confirmed in contemporary studies of
24suicide, individuals' motives are defined as egoistic, anomic, altruistic, or
fatalistic. Egoistic and anomic suicides occur when individuals experience great
disappointments or personal traumas and find the future to offer no hope for
improvement Altruistic suicide takes place when an individual identifies with
the collective good of her society to such an extent that she sees it as her duty
to sacrifice her life to further society's goals. 26 Fatalistic suicides take place in
situations of excessive regulation, such as that of persons with futures blocked,
aspirations choked by oppressive discipline, and persons living under physical
or moral despotism.27 These can occur, for example, in cults where isolated
groups of people living in a highly regulated environment follow their leader in
we do. This, as well as the issue of differences in group size discussed above, is the reason that Harcourt
views racial profiling as unlikely to be efficient, while we argue that racial profiling would nearly
always be efficient.
21. The Knowles et al. model, see supra note 1, and the literature that followed are premised on the
key assumption that racial profiling enhances deterrence, viewing equal hit rates as proof that variation
in search rates across population groups was not driven by racial animus. In the absence of deterrence,
differences in search intensities across population groups that result in equal hit rates are indicative of
racial animosity.
22. ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING To WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 5 (2005).
23. EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson
trans., 1951) (1897).
24. See, e.g., DURKHEIM'S SUICIDE: A CENTURY OF RESEARCH AND DEBATE (W.S.F. Pickering &
Geoffrey Walford eds., 2000).
25. Egoistic suicide is the outcome of a chronic depression whereas anomic suicide is the result of
an abrupt change of circumstances, such as the loss of a child or a spouse. Revenge may be a strong
motive for suicide terrorism. There is a group of female suicide attackers, known as the Black Widows,
who are wives and mothers of Chechens killed by Russian troops. See The Black Widows Strike Again?,
ECONOMIST.COM, Feb. 6, 2004, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?storyid=2419676.
Another well known example is the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by Dhanu, a Tamil Tiger suicide
bomber, who was reportedly gang-raped (and whose four brothers were killed) by Indian soldiers. See
PAPE, supra note 22, at 226-30.
26. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 227. Altruistic suicide can also take place in smaller groups, such
as in the case of a soldier jumping on a hand grenade to protect his friends, or a parent sacrificing her
life in an effort to save her child.
27. Steven Stack, Durkhiem 's Theory of Fatalistic Suicide: A Cross-National Approach, 107 J.





Early literature on suicide terrorism viewed it as driven by egoistic or
anomic motivation-in other words, carried out by people who wished to die
for personal reasons.29 Recent literature views it mostly as an altruistic act,
similar in essence to that of soldiers who are willing to take upon themselves
suicide missions, such as the kamikaze pilots in World War II.30
Whether driven by egoistic or altruistic motivation, monetary or non-
monetary sanctions are clearly irrelevant in the eyes of a person who is willing
to sacrifice his or her life. The suicide terrorist has already accepted the
maximum cost.
To be consistent with the framework presented above, the cost attribute
may be interpreted as capturing the degree of moral inhibition that individuals
have when they consider whether to commit an act of terror.
31
Without being excessively unrealistic, we assume that the population can be
divided into two subgroups: those who have no such inhibitions and will
commit an act of terror regardless of the extent of enforcement (prospective
terrorists); and the rest of the population whose inhibitions are so great that
they will never commit an act of terror irrespective of enforcement level. Thus,
there will be no marginal offenders and hence no deterrence effect. In the
absence of a deterrence effect, racial profiling could serve to promote the goal
of minimizing crime only as a means of enhancing the actual prevention of
terrorist acts-that is, incapacitation.
Unlike the case of drug trafficking, where targeting marginal offenders
reduced crime via enhanced deterrence, crime minimization in the context of
suicide terror is tantamount to hit rate maximization. That is, as cost attributes
cannot be directly observed, assuming that the offending rate differs across
population groups, law enforcement agents should, in the optimum, target only
the group with the higher offending rate.
This comer solution derives from the fact that there is no behavioral
response to policing, and as the cost attribute is assumed to be identically and
independently distributed within each population group, the probability that an
individual member of a certain group is a terrorist is constant, regardless of
enforcement. Thus, minimizing terror implies that, at the margin, police will
28. Consider, for example, the famous Waco standoff, where in April 1993 over seventy people of
the Branch Davidian sect followed their leader, David Koresh, to death by flames. See DAVID
THIBODEAU & LEON WIITESON, A PLACE CALLED WACO: A SURVIVOR'S STORY (1999).
29. E.g., Ariel Merari, The Readiness To Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East, in
ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 192 (Walter Reich ed., 1990).
30. PAPE, supra note 22, at 171-98.
31. As mentioned above, differences in costs are equivalent to differences in benefits, as what
matters from the point of view of the prospective criminal (terrorist) and varies across individuals, is the
net gain. The cost and the detection probability in the absence of profiling are assumed to be uniform
across all individuals.
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always search the individual who is more likely to be a terrorist, who is a
member of the population group for which the offending rate is (constantly)
higher.
32
Two important application points are in order.33 First, due to cognitive
biases, law enforcement agents may rely too much on race and ethnicity in their
assessment of risks compared to other relevant traits, such as nervousness. 34 In
cases in which these biases are significant, ordering security personnel to
ignore race and ethnicity may actually increase profiling efficiency. Second,
notwithstanding the previous point, ethnic profiling is likely to be important in
identifying potential terrorists. Contrary to popular belief,35 relying on
characteristics such as traveling alone on a one-way ticket with no suitcases
(carry-on only), purchasing tickets at the last minute using cash, and checking
in late, are not helpful in identifying terrorists.
All these characteristics make sense. For example, there is no reason to buy
a round-trip ticket if you are planning to crash the plane. Moreover, in order to
allow law enforcement authorities as little time as possible to investigate your
identity, you are better off purchasing the ticket at the last minute and paying
cash.
The problem, however, is that terrorists know that these characteristics are
considered suspicious. The currently employed Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS), which was put in service following
recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security, chaired by Vice President Al Gore in 1997, uses this set of criteria.
36
This system failed to detect the nineteen terrorists who boarded four planes on
September 11. The reason it failed, and is likely to fail again, is that it uses
characteristics that are within the terrorist's control.
The terrorist can travel in company (there seems to be no shortage of
suicide terrorists), buy a round-trip ticket far ahead of time, use a credit card,
give a frequent flier number, arrive early at the airport, and check in one or two
suitcases.
Ethnic origin, on the other hand, is not within the terrorist's control. The
threat faced by the United States is not from Tamil terrorists but mainly from
al-Qaeda and some other Arab or Muslim terror organizations. All nineteen
terrorists who committed the September 1 1 attacks were Muslim Arabs of
32. Even when the behavioral response (deterrence effect) is present, it is likely to be small enough
that the offending rate for one group will exceed that of the other. Crime minimization would still call
for a comer solution, where members of only one group would be searched.
33. We are grateful to Rafi Ron for pointing them out to us. Rafi Ron was in charge of security at
Israel's main airport. Following the September II attacks, he was invited to Logan Airport in Boston to
redesign its security system.
34. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 186-87 (2003).
35. See, e.g., id.
36. Id. at 182-83.
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Middle Eastern ethnicity. This is not a coincidence. The data show that the
majority of al-Qaeda suicide terrorists come from Saudi Arabia and other
Persian Gulf states, and it is assumed that the organization will collapse without
these states' core support.37 It therefore seems that, except for looking nervous,
the only visible characteristic that is positively correlated with being a terrorist
and which is beyond the terrorist's control is his ethnicity.
Acknowledging the failure of CAPPS on September 11, a new system,
38named CAPPS II, was developed. This system was designed to focus on the
type of characteristics that terrorists may find difficult to mask or change. It
was designed to perform background checks on each passenger reserving a
flight to determine the passenger's "risk" to airline safety.
The system was supposed to rely on commercial companies that are in the
business of compiling extensive dossiers about the lives of most Americans to
assess their credit risk. This information was supposed to be added to a
database containing the information available in all government databases. A
special algorithm was then supposed to be used to derive every passenger's
flight safety score. This could result in either enhanced or reduced use of racial
profiling, depending on how important ethnic origin would remain as a
predictor of terrorism, when additional information that is beyond the terrorist's
control is available. Airport security personnel were supposed to search
passengers according to their safety scores.
The development of the system was stopped because the system was
viewed to pose an excessive threat to the freedom and privacy of the people.
39
40A new system, codenamed "Secure Flight," is now under development. It is
supposed to be a mild version of CAPPS II, but no official information is
available at the time of writing this Article.
37. See PAPE, supra note 22, at 125.
38. See Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Undersec'y of Homeland Sec., Remarks at a CAPPS II Media
Roundtable (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content-3166
(explaining that the Department of Homeland Security plans to implement testing of the program before
the end of 2004); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: CAPPS II at a Glance, Feb.
12, 2004, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3162.
39. See, e.g., Leslie Miller, New Passenger Screening Plan Not Ready To Fly, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 14, 2004, at 46; Chris Stronh, DHS Scraps Computer Pre-Screening System, Starts Over,
GovExEC.COM, July 15, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0704/071504cl.htm. For discussion
of the threats that computerized pre-screening systems pose to privacy, civil rights and due process, see,
for example, Leigh A. Kite, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process Rights ofAirline Passengers:
Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System Meet the Constitutional Challenge?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1385
(2004); John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American Liberties in a Dangerous
Digital World, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 509, 524 (2005); K.A. Taipale, Technology, Security and
Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 123 (2004-05).
40. See Thomas Frank, Chertoff." Privacy Fears Not Justified, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 2005, at IA;
Sarah Lai Stirland, Bush Administration Urged To Delay Launch of Passenger Screening System,
GoVEXEC.COM, Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0305/032405tdpml.htm.
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II. EQUITY
The fact that racial profiling is efficient does not mean that it is socially
desirable. As reflected in the revived debate on the merits and pitfalls of
profiling, equity considerations must be taken into account.4'
There are two categories of inequities entailed by racial profiling. The first
category, which we will call "horizontal inequity," includes inequities that are
caused by any profiling rule.
The other category, which is the more significant one, has to do with racial
profiling, and we will refer to it as the "stigma effect."
The third Section below analyzes a major equity concern in the United
States which is often associated with profiling and relates to the two categories
mentioned above: the higher incarceration rate of African Americans.
A. Horizontal Inequity
42
Profiling is a form of decisionmaking by generalization. In fact, all rules
rely to some extent on generalizations, as unequal cases that fall under the same
legal rule are treated as if they were equal.
43 But profiling makes this explicit.
44
Instead of examining the individual, a profiling rule looks at the characteristics
of the group to which that individual belongs. Relying on generalizations is
45clearly wrong when they are spurious. But even when generalizations have a
sound statistical basis, they still may entail horizontal inequity.
Inequity is caused by any generalization that is not universal, that is, a
generalization that does not apply equally to all cases, objects, or people.
Universal generalizations are usually pointless, as is, for example, the
following universal generalization: all bachelors are unmarried.46
The vast majority of generalizations are non-universal. For example, when
we say that Volvos are reliable, we know that some Volvos are not. A
41. Our discussion of equity considerations is done from a policy perspective. We therefore assume
no police abuse, and no disproportionate use of profiling; that is, we assume that the technique is applied
to all communities and in all situations in which it is found to be efficient.
42. See SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 21.
43. A straightforward example would be the sixty-five mile per hour speed limit that is equally
applied to drivers regardless of differences in weather conditions, driving skills or personal
circumstances.
44. And is therefore considered to be wrong by all who cherish particularism. See SCHAUER, supra
note 34, at 20 (quoting WILLIAM BLAKE, ANNOTATIONS TO SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS'S DISCOURSES
(1808) ("To generalize is to be an idiot. To particularize is the alone distinction of merit.")).
45. And this is indeed one of the claims against the use of racial profiling. For racial profiling to be
justified (on efficiency or equity grounds) it has to be based on a sound statistical basis. Whether African
Americans have a higher propensity to traffic drugs is a hotly debated question. We argue that the
relevant statistical basis may be different depending on the type of crime. Where deterrence is thought to
be the dominant factor in crime reduction, the relevant statistic is their representation in the group of
marginal offenders.




generalization may be considered statistically sound even when it does not
apply to the majority of the cases, objects, or people within its category. For
example, saying that pit bulls are vicious and dangerous, when only a minority
of pit bulls is vicious and dangerous, stands as a sound claim so long as the
percentage of vicious and dangerous dogs of other breeds is (significantly)
lower. The generalization tracks down the relevant information, which is
comparative .47
Therefore, although the majority of pit bulls are not dangerous, and
although some dogs of any breed are dangerous, we may wish to regulate pit
bulls, while not regulating other breeds, based on statistics such as those
indicated by the Humane Society of the United States report, according to
which twenty of the twenty-eight deaths from dog bites between 1983 and 1987
were attributed to pit bull bites when pit bulls accounted for only about one
percent of all American dogs.48
Profiling is therefore inequitable in its overinclusiveness. Many pit bulls,
possibly most pit bulls, although not dangerous, are regulated.49 Such profiling
may prove efficient if examining each individual is determined to be too
costly.50 However, the individual pit bulls (and their owners) are paying a cost.
This cost may be high, if for example, the regulation prohibits people from
owning or breeding pit bulls. The generalizing rule would be efficient if the
cost saved is greater than the cost incurred.
Specifically, the policymaker has to assess the cost of examining individual
dogs at a level that would achieve the same reduction in dog bites as the
reduction that would be achieved by a regulation that forbids people from
owning pit bulls. This cost should then be compared with the cost incurred by
pit bull lovers due to the regulation. In the case that individual examination is
not an option, the cost that should be compared with the cost incurred by pit
bull lovers is the cost entailed by the expected increase in dog bites.
Turning our attention from cars and dogs to people, we can see that
individuals who are stopped and searched (and possibly fined or incarcerated if
found guilty) more often than others who are identical to them in all respects
other than race bear a disproportionate share of the cost that society pays for
law enforcement.
This is an example of a non-universal generalization, similar to the ones
discussed above. According to our marginal analysis, which we developed in
Part I above, the comparison is more complicated, because unlike cars and
47. See SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 11.
48. See id. at 59 (citing Peter Applebome, Series of Pit Bull Attacks Stirs a Clamor for Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1987, at A24).
49. Profiling is also underinclusive, as some dangerous dogs are not pit bulls and are therefore not
regulated. This must be taken into account when assessing the rule's efficiency.
50. "High cost" includes the case of impossibility to measure, which would be defined as infinite
cost.
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dogs, people may respond to the profiling rule and change their behavior.
Therefore, unlike targeting pit bulls as being more dangerous, it is possible that
the efficient profiling rule, when people are the object, would target the group
with the lower offending rate (Labradors), but with higher representation in the
marginal offenders group.
Nevertheless, the horizontal inequity caused by the profiling rule is the
same in all cases. The individual members of the targeted group are paying the
cost of providing a public good, security, to all society members. The rest of
society benefits from the savings derived from not conducting an individual
examination of each pit bull, or every person, while not sharing in the burden.
51
The cost of regulation, or search, is borne by the targeted group members alone.
This applies to the innocent and to criminals alike.52 The innocent members
of the targeted group are subject to more frequent searches, with the entailed
inconvenience, humiliation, and loss of time, compared to the rest of society;
the criminals face all of the above as well as a higher probability of getting
caught compared to criminals who are not members of the targeted group.
We think that equity considerations require that criminals should face the
same probability of getting caught regardless of their race or ethnicity.
Enforcing criminal law to a greater extent with respect to targeted-group
individuals is similar to sentencing targeted-group individuals more severely
than the rest of the population.53 Acknowledging equity costs only with respect
to innocent targeted-group individuals who were directly touched by police
enforcement on different levels (searched, interrogated, incarcerated) is
insufficient. Equity costs should account for the higher probability of being
searched, interrogated, or incarcerated, faced by all members of the targeted
group, relative to the rest of the population. This applies to the innocent and to
criminals alike.
It may be important to note that from an ex post perspective, any penal rule
would be horizontally inequitable, since enforcement is incomplete. Under a
random search rule some people are searched while others are not, and some
criminals get caught while others remain free. Ex ante, however, is the relevant
perspective for a normative analysis. A random search rule treats all individuals
equally from an ex ante perspective, whereas a profiling rule inequitably
distributes the expected costs of search and punishment.
54
51. When individual examination is impossible, the social benefit is reduction in crime level or in
terror.
52. The literature, in general, does not account for the inequity costs incurred by targeted group
criminals. The discussion of inequity is focused on the innocent alone. See, e.g., Gross & Barnes, supra
note 12, at 744 ("No one denies that racial profiling imposes costs on minorities: more innocent blacks
and Hispanics than whites are stopped, detained, questioned and searched.").
53. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 234.
54. Applying an ex ante perspective, which by definition measures equity costs borne by innocent
as well as criminal minority group individuals, is consistent with the criminal behavior model that was
used in Part I to measure efficiency, which assumed that agents were expected-payoff maximizers.
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A profiling rule could be justified in a society that does all it can to equally
distribute the overall burden in the production of public goods, so that those
who bear a relatively greater burden in the production of security would be
relatively less burdened in the production of some other public goods. Society




Racial profiling involves an additional type of harm, which is its
stigmatizing effect on targeted group members. Members of the stigmatized
group are likely to feel resentment, hurt, and loss of trust in the police." The
stigmatizing effect of profiling is what makes racial profiling very close to
discrimination in the type of effects it has on minorities, even though racial
profiling is not rooted in personal prejudice.
The harm caused by profiling is largely due to underlying racism and not to
the profiling rule itself. The harm is therefore mostly expressive in nature; it
primarily relates to the fact that the targeted group has already been
discriminated against, and less to the profiling per se that causes only
horizontal inequity as described above.57 Thus, for example, profiling drivers
by age (rather than by race) because young drivers are more prone to be
involved in car accidents does not seem to raise similar equity concerns. Being
young is generally considered to be an advantage. On the other hand, profiling
minorities or women results in significant equity costs, as it reminds the
targeted group members of their being discriminated against.
8
The stigma effect is by far the more significant equity cost. This makes it
plausible to assume that if the majority, and not the minority, would be
targeted-an option that is raised in this Article as a possible outcome of an
accurate efficiency analysis even if African Americans have higher offending
55. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997) (viewing minorities as being
made to pay a "racial tax" that whites are not required to pay). But cf. Banks, supra note 1, at 594
("Drug enforcement efforts that burden some racial minorities may also disproportionately benefit those
racial minorities whose neighborhoods are most plagued by drug dealing and its associated problems.");
Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 162-69 (noting that it is possible that African Americans are also
the main beneficiaries of a racial profiling rule, because crimes committed by African Americans against
African Americans are reduced, and thus the increased security costs borne by African Americans are
offset by their increased benefits from law enforcement).
56. See KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 25-27.
57. Being expressive in nature, racial profiling does not contribute to an oppressive relationship and
does not amount to pejorative discrimination. See John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action,
and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of
Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 423, 540-42 (2002).
58. See Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 147 ("Suppose a person is seeking credit in a poorly
organized department store. It takes forty-five minutes to process an application. While a white person is
likely to see incompetence, an African American, sensitive to disparate treatment, may conclude that the
slow response was due to her race. Racism elsewhere makes the forty-five-minute wait, unrelated to
race, an expressive harm.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
rates than the general population-racial profiling may come at minor costs to
society.
In fact, it may well be the case that profiling the majority population (the
"whites") could be both efficient and equity enhancing. Profiling the majority
population will not entail significant equity costs because these costs suggest
some underlying discrimination, while African Americans will benefit from the
"negative" profiling.
If we take into account the horizontal equity costs (entailed by the whites) it
is an open question whether the benefit derived by the African Americans from
the "negative" profiling is greater than the equity cost bome by whites due to
their profiling.
We do know that the gains derived by African Americans from "negative"
racial profiling are likely to be smaller than the (great) costs borne by them
when they are the ones being profiled, due to the general psychological
phenomenon known as loss aversion.
59
But it may still be the case that their gains are greater than the (small) costs
borne by the whites, when the whites are targeted. When whites are being
targeted they bear only the horizontal inequity costs. When African Americans
are being targeted they bear both horizontal inequity and stigma costs. The
stigma costs are much greater than the horizontal inequity costs. Therefore, it is
plausible to assume that when the whites are being targeted, the gains derived
by African Americans from "negative" profiling are greater than the losses
incurred by the whites.
C. Higher Incarceration Rates
A major equity concern regarding profiling minorities is the alleged impact
it has on overrepresentation of targeted (profiled) group members in the
incarcerated population.60 This entails both horizontal inequity (a higher
probability of being incarcerated) and a stigma effect, whereby from observing
the incarcerated population one might conclude that targeted population group
members were more inclined to criminal activity.
61
Empirical findings suggest disproportional incarceration rates of African
59. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) ("[Llosses loom larger than gains.").
60. Another equity concern is the phenomenon of the higher recidivism rate among the targeted
population. This could be a result of (non-racial) profiling based on the presumption that individuals
who had been convicted in the past are more likely to engage in crime. This amplifies the effects of the
differences in incarceration rates in the first place.
61. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 191, 213 (1998) (recognizing that all African Americans are stigmatized as criminals by a law
enforcement strategy that produces prisons in which half the inmates are African Americans); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 801-18 (1999) (describing how disproportionate criminal supervision
and incarceration made blacks and Latinos appear lawless).
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Americans, who comprise about twelve percent of the general population but
account for fifty-four percent of prison admissions. 62 The literature often
attributes this phenomenon to the application of criminal profiling rules.
63
The overrepresentation of African Americans in the incarcerated population
may be driven by two factors: a higher offending rate relative to the average
offending rate of the population, and a higher search rate due to a profiling rule
which targets them.
The existence of significantly higher incarceration rates amongst targeted
population groups does not in itself prove that their higher incarceration rates
are the result of an efficient profiling rule. First, racial profiling, to the extent it
is currently employed, may be inefficient, as it does not necessarily target the
marginal offenders. Second, an efficient profiling rule is likely to lower the
offending rate of the targeted population, while increasing that of the rest of the
population, relative to a random search rule. This could possibly result in equal
offending rates, or even in a lower rate for the targeted group.
It is possible, however, that efficient racial profiling would result in
significantly higher incarceration rates amongst targeted population groups, and
racial profiling may indeed be a reason for the overrepresentation of African
Americans in the incarcerated population. To see this, consider the following
simple example.
There is a medium-sized metropolitan area with a population of one
million. The population is divided into two groups, minority group (twenty
percent of the population) and majority group. 64 According to police data, each
year ten percent of the population is searched for drug trafficking by the local
police authority vice squad.
Police officers are not allowed to employ profiling rules, and therefore
search at random (indeed police data show that roughly twenty percent of the
individuals that have been stopped and searched are of minority origin).
According to police data, the offending rate of the minority population group is
ten percent and that of the majority group is five percent. In the past year, the
number of minority drug-convicted prisoners was 2000, and that of the majority
group was 4000.
62. John J. Donohue & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 367, 367 (2001).
63. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 135-49 (2003)
(implicitly assuming zero elasticity); Harcourt, supra note 1, at 1329-35 (taking elasticity into account
but positing that African Americans are likely to have both higher offending rate and lower elasticity
compared to whites); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal
Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 105, 117-28 (2003) (same). But
see Banks, supra note 1, at 580-81 (implicitly assuming elasticity and noting that "[i]f officers allocate
investigative resources based not on the number of prior arrests among each group but instead based on
the groups' relative hit rates, racial profiling is more likely to be self-correcting than self-fulfilling").
64. By assuming that the population is large, one can apply the law of large numbers and
approximate actual values by their expectations.
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The statistics reflect the sharp differences in offending rates across groups.
Although minority and majority groups face the same search probability (ten
percent), because the offending rate of the minority group (ten percent) exceeds
that of the majority group (five percent), the incarceration rate of the minority
population, given by the product of the search rate and its offending rate, is one
percent (hence 2000 out of a population of 200,000 are imprisoned), whereas
the incarceration rate of the majority population group is 0.5% (4000 out of a
population of 800,000).
To conclude, while the minority forms twenty percent of the population, the
proportion of minority individuals in the incarcerated population is thirty-three
percent (2000 of the 6000 prisoners).
Imagine that you are nominated as the new police commissioner and you
are concerned about the high drug-related crime level in the city. In the past
year, there were 60,000 cases of drug crimes.65 Due to the recent federal budget
cuts, you cannot expect increased resources in the future, so you consider the
use of a racial profiling rule to enhance police deterrence, thereby reducing the
crime level.
A recent expert report of a special committee that you appointed to examine
the issue suggested that forty percent of the searches should be conducted on
minority individuals (40,000 of the 100,000 searches).
The committee expects the offending rate of the minority group to drop to
7.5%, while the corresponding offending rate of the majority group would rise
to 5.5%. The expected crime rate would thus be 0.075 * 200,000 + 0.055 *
800,000 = 59,000: a reduction of 1000 drug related crimes relative to current
year statistics.
While profiling seems to be efficient in light of the expected reduction in
the crime level in the city, you are concerned that the profiling rule would raise
the proportion of minority individuals in the incarcerated population.
On one hand, in light of the reduction in the offending rate of the minority
population (and the corresponding rise in that of the majority group) one could
expect no such problem. On the other hand, the rise in search intensity of the
minority population may more than offset the reduction in the offending rate.
So you do the following calculation.
The incarceration rate of the minority population group, after the proposed
profiling rule is implemented, would be given by the product of the search rate
(0.2 = 40,000 / 200,000) and the offending rate (0.075), hence, 1.5%.
The corresponding incarceration rate of the majority population group
would be given by the product of the search rate (0.075 = 60,000 / 800,000)
65. Crime level for each group is simply the product of the group offending rate and its population




and the offending rate 0.055, hence 0.4125%.
Multiplying incarceration rates by the respective population size yields the
expectation of 3000 drug-related convicted minority individuals, and 3300
convicted majority individuals.
As you find out, profiling would raise the proportion of minority prisoners
to almost fifty percent (although they represent only twenty percent of the
general population) from thirty-three percent under a random search rule.
As mentioned above, the existence of significantly higher incarceration
rates amongst targeted population groups does not in itself prove that their
higher incarceration rates are the result of racial profiling.
In general, it is possible that, contrary to the above example, the effect of a
racial profiling rule, which works in the direction of increasing the difference in
incarceration rates, will be more than offset by the induced change in offending
rates, which works in the opposite direction. This could result in reduced
differences in incarceration rates, relative to the random search benchmark.
Due to the missing data regarding the composition of the marginal
offenders' population and racial group relative elasticities, information that is
not being gathered under current (as opposed to our proposed) racial profiling
rule, we are unable to predict the effect that an efficient racial profiling rule,
like the one we discuss, will have on incarceration rates.
III. EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF
The policymaker has to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the
socially desirable extent of racial profiling, striking a balance between equity
and efficiency considerations. Ideally, the policymaker seeks to fully eliminate
all inequities while maintaining the efficiency of resource allocation. In our
context, however, attaining efficiency generally implies using racial profiling
rules, as explained in Part I above. In such a case, equity concerns arise, as
discussed in Part II.
Thus, when racial minorities are being targeted, in order to eliminate (or
mitigate) inequity, the policymaker is inevitably bound to compromise on
efficiency, namely by shifting the policy toward a random search rule. This is
based on the assumption that the extent of profiling is the only control variable
at the policymaker's disposal, as we have assumed so far.
66
There is, however, another possibility, which is to use the tax and transfer
system to compensate members of the targeted group for the disutility they
suffer. Awarding compensation is mentioned in the racial profiling literature,
66. Note that even when the policymaker has a wider set of policy tools at her disposal, such as
extending legal job opportunities or providing high quality education, as long as some profiling were
part of the efficient resource allocation, the tradeoff between equity and efficiency would remain
unscathed.
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but only as regards innocent targeted group members. 67 In the next Section, we
will argue that it should be awarded to all targeted group members, innocent
and criminal alike, and on an ex ante basis.
A. Awarding Compensation
Racial profiling puts targeted group members at greater risk of being
searched, interrogated or incarcerated. This affects their lives, even before a
search takes place, and even if no search ever takes place.
For example, an innocent group-A individual who plans to drive on a
highway needs to consider longer expected commuting time; a group-A
criminal weighing the cost and benefits of committing a crime should consider
the higher probability of getting caught and punished. This calls for
compensation.
Compensating innocent targeted group individuals on an ex post basis,
namely, awarding compensation to each innocent member of the targeted group
who was searched, as suggested in racial profiling literature, is inefficient.
Awarding compensation on an ex post basis would induce behavioral
effects and therefore is likely to entail distortions. Innocent targeted group
members who value the compensation more than the costs of being searched
(i.e., waste of time, risk of being charged with an offence with which they did
not expect to be charged, etc.) will have an incentive to be searched.
This may seem far-fetched, but as the following example will show, it is
quite realistic, even today when no "official" compensation is being paid to
innocent searched passengers. One of the authors of this article was "randomly
selected" for an extensive search at London Heathrow airport. He was asked to
leave the check-in line and was searched in a separate room. After he was
cleared, his suitcase was boarded on the plane without the author having to go
through the check-in counter. It occurred to the author that a passenger with an
overweight luggage could avoid paying overweight charges by acting
suspiciously.
The courtesy of not requiring the innocent searched passenger to return to
the check-in counter is a form of (non-monetary) compensation. As the
example shows, ex post compensation entails distortions as it may induce
certain passengers to behave suspiciously to invite a search.
As for targeted (group-A) criminals, the literature does not suggest that they
be offered compensation. As argued above, equity considerations call for
compensating them as well, for being discriminated against in comparison to
group- W criminals. Awarding group-A criminals ex post compensation,
namely, awarding compensation to targeted group members who were searched




even if found guilty, may reduce deterrence, while awarding compensation ex
ante would have no such effect.
We therefore conclude that equity concerns should be compensated for on
an ex ante basis. Awarding compensation on an ex ante basis is not the
prevailing norm.6 8 However, in the context of racial profiling, ex ante
compensation would address equity concerns while creating less distortion than
awarding compensation on an ex post basis.
69
However, public hostility towards transfers (pecuniary or in kind) as an
appropriate means of addressing racial issues may preclude the use of the tax
system to compensate the targeted group. People care about the symbolic value
of laws and suffer disutility because of their distaste for what they see as
allowing discriminators to purchase rights to discriminate. This may be true
even though racial profiling does not involve racial animus, but is merely
expressive.
Consider a case where an efficient profiling rule calls for extensive
targeting of a group, say, African Americans, that suffers from underlying
discrimination. People may find it objectionable if police were to search almost
exclusively African Americans, and in turn, give all African Americans a
monetary (or in kind) transfer or a tax credit to compensate them for the
inequity caused by the profiling rule.
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68. Tort law does not impose liability for the creation of risk; a tort liability must rest on the
existence of actual damage. See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
101-29 (2001) (discussing the option of imposing a tort liability for the creation of bare risk, but
assuming that the victim of the tort will be paid according to the actual damage and rejecting a risk-
based system of liability for, inter alia, being too difficult to enforce). But cf Robert Cooter & Stephen
D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174-85 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) (suggesting the creation of a market for
unmatured tort claims, where potential victims would be able to sell their tort rights).
69. The advantage of awarding compensation on an ex post basis derives from the ability to
distinguish between criminals and the innocent. On one hand, it seems that criminals are less deserving
from a moral point of view. On the other hand, targeted group criminals are exposed to two different
layers of discrimination, when compared to criminals in the non-targeted population group, whereas
their innocent counterparts are subject to one layer only. The former face both a higher probability of
being searched and incarcerated, whereas the latter face only a higher search probability. As the two
effects work in opposite directions, assuming that they offset each other warrants uniform compensation.
Hence, ex ante compensation would be desirable.
70. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
47-64 (1992) (defending antidiscrimination laws by discussing the problems with a hypothetical Racial
Preference Licensing Act that would enable people with a preference for discrimination to purchase a
license to do that); John J. Donohue III, Discrimination in Employment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 615, 619-20 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (making, inter alia,
the points that antidiscrimination laws have an educative role that the tax and transfer system could not
efficiently replace, and that a clear prohibition on discrimination through legal rules does not provide
opportunities for rent seeking activity, while setting payments and subsidies invites such pressures); Kim
Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and
Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REv. 683, 751 (2004) ("[M]onetary compensation seems unlikely to redress the
nature of societal discrimination's damage.").
71. See Cooter, supra note 7, at 144-49 (suggesting the use of tax subsidies and transferable rights
in a case of gender discrimination to illustrate his argument that anti-discrimination laws should be
replaced by a market-based approach, but acknowledging the fact that economic analysis has no theory
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Even if compensation were a viable policy option and awarded to all
targeted group members on an ex ante basis, racial profiling could serve as a
good example of a case in which the policymaker should nevertheless deviate
from the most efficient rule to accommodate equity concerns. This connects our
discussion to a central debate in the law and economics literature: whether legal
rules should be designed based on efficiency grounds only, or whether they
should be equitably informed.72
B. Profiling and the Tax Versus Legal Rules Debate
Starting from the most efficient level of profiling, seeking to mitigate the
entailed equity costs, there are two alternatives to consider: (i) using the tax-
and-transfer system to compensate the targeted population, or (ii) modifying
the profiling rule towards a random search rule.
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The prevailing norm seems to be that the design of legal rules should be
guided by efficiency considerations only, relegating redistribution exclusively
to the tax and transfer system.74 Applying this view to the racial profiling case
could justify choosing the first alternative, namely, setting the screening rule at
its most efficient point and compensating for the inequity through the tax and
transfer system.
We posit that in the case of racial profiling the policymaker should
nevertheless deviate from the most efficient rule to accommodate equity
of the symbolic and educational function of law and admitting that the current attitude and values of
American society do not conform to his market-based approach-thus viewing his proposal as meant for
the future).
72. For arguments in support of using legal rules for redistribution purposes, see, for example,
Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A
Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1125 (2004); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth,
On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 1 (2005); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE
L.J. 1211 (1991); Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TA L. REV. 157 (2003); Chris William
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1003 (2001) [hereinafter
Sanchirico, New Efficiency]; Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). For arguments that support the
exclusive use of the tax and transfer system for redistribution purposes, see, for example, A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNoMics 119-27 (1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution].
73. Due to the expressive nature of the equity cost entailed by the profiling rule, see Part II, supra,
a third alternative, which is beyond the scope of this Article, would be an enhanced anti-discrimination
policy in other areas of life such as in the labor market, which would reduce the underlying
discrimination.




We follow Sanchirico's analogy in viewing the two alternatives, namely,
modifying the profiling rule in the direction of the random search rule or
awarding compensation, as two factors in the production of equity. 5 Plausibly
assuming rising marginal costs, both tools should be employed, and the extent
of each should be set to the optimum where marginal costs are equalized.
We argue that some deviation from the efficient legal rule (designed to
minimize crime) is socially desirable in the sense that it would result in a
reduction in the measure of aggregate social costs. Aggregate social cost is
given by a weighted average of the social costs associated with efficiency and
equity.
On the efficiency side, the social cost of crime is assumed to be increasing
with respect to the crime level, and it is further assumed that the marginal
social cost of crime is increasing.76 The cost of taxation is associated with the
tax revenues raised to finance the compensation awarded to the targeted
population, and is assumed to be increasing with respect to tax revenues raised.
It is further assumed that the marginal cost is increasing.77
On the equity side, the equity cost entailed by profiling is naturally assumed
to be increasing with respect to the level of profiling, decreasing with respect to
the amount of the awarded compensation, and increasing with respect to the
degree of underlying discrimination.
To see the argument, assume that profiling is set at its most efficient level
(such that crime is minimized) by targeting minority group members who
suffer from some underlying discrimination. Further assume that equity
concerns are addressed by awarding compensation to the minority group
members.
Consider the following deviation from the (constrained) social optimum
described above.78 Suppose that the policymaker slightly decreases the number
of minority group individuals being examined, while correspondingly
increasing the number of majority group individuals investigated, maintaining a
fixed number of searches.
Such marginal reform would entail no efficiency costs starting from the
optimal allocation of policy resources, but would somewhat reduce the equity
costs suffered by the targeted group (the minority group), as the equity cost is
assumed to be increasing in the extent of profiling, and some profiling is
75. See Sanchirico, New Efficiency, supra note 72, at 1021 ("The right question is not 'which is
best?' but rather 'what is the best combination?').
76. Note that crime level depends on the search rule chosen by the police.
77. Note that the social cost of taxation depends only on the level of compensation, and is
independent of the level of crime, as the compensation is awarded on an ex ante basis.
78. Constrained in the sense that equity concerns are addressed solely by the tax and transfer
system.
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assumed to be efficient. This will occur without the need for extending more
generous transfers.
The conclusion is that leaving the equity-enhancing role exclusively to the
tax-and-transfer system would be socially undesirable. That is, when equity
concerns are present, the extent of profiling should be somewhat reduced
relative to its efficient benchmark, and possibly discarded. This would be the
case when equity costs are so large as to justify a comer solution where even a
slight change from a random search rule entails equity costs large enough to
outweigh the efficiency gains of profiling.
If there is no underlying discrimination, and hence inequity derives
primarily from the violation of the principle of horizontal equity and is not due
to the stigmatizing effect of profiling, it is plausible to assume that the marginal
equity cost associated with a small shift away from a random search rule is
rather low, and in such a case, some profiling would be warranted by virtue of a
similar marginal analysis to the one used above. Moreover, racially profiling
the majority group members may be warranted on redistributive grounds, as
explained in Section II.B. supra, if minorities benefit from "negative profiling,"
thus making racial profiling both efficient and equitable.
Note the crucial difference from the case where stigma is involved; in such
a case, even a small deviation from a random search rule may entail significant
equity costs, as it would build on an already existing layer of discrimination.79
CONCLUSION
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the intensive debate over the
social desirability of using racial profiling in criminal law enforcement and in
fighting terror. Using Becker's model of crime, we demonstrate the fallacy of
targeting racial population groups according to their (higher) group-wise
offending rates-namely, their average propensity to engage in crime.
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We show that when the objective is minimizing crime by enhancing
deterrence, racial profiling would prove efficient only if there is a correlation
between race and being a marginal offender. Assuming that there is such a
correlation, it would be desirable to target members of racial population groups
who are overrepresented in the group of marginal offenders relative to their
share in the general population.
We use our concept of "marginal offender" to make a novel distinction
79. Conducting comparative static of the social optimum, one can formally show (and such a
formal presentation is on file with the authors) that the less legitimate the pecuniary transfers are
perceived to be, and/or the less efficient the tax system is, the larger the optimal downward adjustment
in the extent of profiling. One can also demonstrate that when the marginal equity costs associated with
profiling increase with respect to the degree of underlying discrimination, the optimal extent of profiling
naturally decreases with respect to the level of underlying discrimination.
80. Targeting racial populations according to their group-wise propensity to engage in crime is the
prevailing norm, as reflected in data showing that police maximize the hit rate.
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between ordinary crime (e.g., the war on drugs) and terror. Whereas in the
context of ordinary crime, law enforcement focuses on deterrence (leading to
our conclusion that racial profiling should target marginal offenders), in the
context of terror, incapacitation prevails, justifying targeting the group with the
higher offending rate-that is, "hit rate maximization."
We prove that barring knife-edge cases, profiling is always efficient,
helping the police to mitigate the screening problem when criminal activity
varies across racial groups. Notably, efficient racial profiling policy may
counterintuitively call for targeting the group with the lower offending rates.
Moreover, we show that contrary to conventional wisdom, group size does not
matter.
Although desirable in a second-best world with asymmetries of
information, using racial profiling may raise significant equity concerns as
evinced by the intense scholarly and public debate. We draw attention to the
possibility that racial profiling would promote both efficiency and equity in
case efficiency calls for targeting the majority population group.
Discussing the more prevalent case in which racial minorities are being
targeted, we argue that the appropriate benchmark for equity costs should be set
at the point of the random search rule, and that costs should be evaluated from
an ex ante perspective and include all targeted group members, innocent as well
as criminal, whether touched by police enforcement or not.
Viewing the problem of setting the optimal profiling rule as a traditional
welfare economics problem of striking the balance between efficiency and
equity considerations, we challenge what seems to be the conventional wisdom
of the law and economics literature and suggest that the optimal profiling rule
should be modified away from its most efficient point to accommodate equity
concerns, rather than leaving this exclusively to the tax and transfer system.
When awarding compensation to targeted group members is employed to
mitigate equity costs entailed by profiling, we posit that, unlike in the case of
tort law, compensation should be awarded on an ex ante basis for efficiency
reasons.
To sum up, existing racial profiling policy comes at a very high cost to
society while the prevailing practice of targeting the group with the higher
propensity to commit crimes does not necessarily reduce crime. In fact, under
the plausible assumption that police enforcement resources are constrained, it
may even increase the number of criminals.
Having more data on the group of marginal offenders could help the
policymaker to tailor a racial profiling policy that would minimize crime. At
least in theory, such data could also affect the inherent equity-efficiency
tradeoff in relation to certain crimes, as it could call for targeting majority
group members instead of minorities. Awarding compensation could further
mitigate the inequity costs and must be seriously considered.
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Figure 1 depicts the probability distribution functions (PDF) of the cost of
committing crime, c, for group A (the dotted line) and for group W (the solid
line). When police employ a random search rule, individuals of both population
groups face the same detection probability. Thus, the cost threshold above
which individuals abide by the law is the same for both population groups,
given in the figure by point .
The area under the PDF of each population group (to the left of cost
threshold a) represents its respective offending rate under a random search
rule-namely, the proportion of individuals in the population group for which
the cost of committing crime is small enough (lower than c) to induce them to
engage in criminal activity. As can be observed from the figure, consistent with
our assumption, the offending rate of group A exceeds that of the rest of the
population (group W). The area under the dotted line and to the left of cost
threshold c is greater than the same area under the solid line. Individuals
whose costs are lower than cost threshold a will commit crime; therefore,
group A members are more prone to commit crimes than group W members.
However, we also see that the proportion of marginal offenders in group W
exceeds that of group A. This is captured by the fact that at the threshold a, the
PDF of the cost of committing crime corresponding to group W lies above the
PDF that corresponds to group A. This is because the proportion of individuals
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who are equally likely to commit a crime or to abide by the law (incurring the
cost ) is higher amongst group W. Thus, although on average a group-A
member has a higher propensity to commit a crime, enhanced deterrence calls
for targeting group-W members (the group with the higher proportion of
"marginal offenders").

